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We empirically investigate the effect of uncertainty on corporate
hiring. Using novel data from the labor market for MBA graduates,
we show that uncertainty regarding howwell job candidates fitwith
a firm’s industry hinders hiring and that firms value probationary
work arrangements that provide the option to learn more about
potential full-time employees. The detrimental effect of uncertainty
on hiring is more pronounced when firms face greater firing and
replacement costs and when they face less direct competition from
other similar firms. These results suggest that firms faced with
uncertainty use similar considerations when making hiring deci-
sions as when making decisions regarding investment in physical
capital.
I. Introduction
Human capital is a critical asset for firms, yet the process by which com-
panies decide who to hire is still not well understood. The decision to hire
We thank Bruno Biais, Nicholas Bloom, Steven Grenadier, Boyan Jovanovic,
Robert McDonald, Derek Neal, Scott Schaefer, Martin Schmalz, Kelly Shue, and
participants in numerous seminars and conferences for their comments and sug-
gestions. Contact the corresponding author, Paul Oyer, at pauloyer@stanford.
edu. Information concerning access to the data used in this article is available as
supplementary material online.
[ Journal of Labor Economics, 2016, vol. 34, no. 2, pt. 2]
© 2016 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0734-306X/2016/34S2-0009$10.00
Submitted March 25, 2014; Accepted April 28, 2015; Electronically published February 11, 2016
S255
This content downloaded from 152.019.225.081 on April 01, 2016 08:53:34 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
people is similar to the decision to invest in physical assets, as both types of
investments are generally made under uncertainty regarding their future
productivity. Here we combine insights from the investments literature in
finance and from the labor and personnel economics literature to conduct
an empirical analysis of the process by which firms select employees.1
Studying theMBA hiringmarket, we find that uncertainty regarding the
productivity of potential employees, which we capture through a lack of
prior experience in a hiring firm’s industry, has a negative effect on firms’
hiring. We document that corporations value temporary employment ar-
rangements that provide the option to learn about the productivity of
workers before making long-term hiring decisions. The hindering effect of
uncertainty on corporate hiring is more pronounced when firing and re-
placement costs are lower ðas they are in the case of summer internsÞ and
when firms face less competition from other firms in their industry. The
patterns in hiring that we document here are similar in many ways to those
shown by the literature studying the effects of uncertainty on corporate
investment in physical assets.2
Our empirical setting is the labor market for students at a large and pres-
tigiousMBAprogram. In our sample, a large fraction of job applicants have
unknown industry fit, which creates uncertainty regarding their future
productivity. We find that firms prefer to make offers to candidates char-
acterized by low uncertainty—namely, those individuals who haveworked
in the firm’s industry. These applicants’ odds of success at getting a job
offer are 1.71 times higher than those of applicants characterized by more
uncertainty regarding their industry fit.
We document that employers value the option to learn about candidates
lacking industry experience by making significant use of cheap probation-
ary employment—namely, summer intern positions after the students’ first
year in the MBA program—which allow the termination of revealed poor
matches at low cost. We document that separation rates at the end of the
summer are 19% higher for interns without industry expertise relative to
their more experienced peers, indicating that probationary employment is
used to learn about candidates’ industry fit.
Consistent with the idea that exploration of riskier workers is costlier
past the probationary employment stage, we show that the preference that
firms have toward hiring less uncertain applicants is significantly stronger
at the full-time recruiting stage as compared to the internship stage. At the
full-time stage, a low-uncertainty candidate has 2.38 times better odds of
1 See Oyer and Schaefer ð2011Þ for a review of the successes and limitations of
the economics literature on employer-employee matching. For empirical evidence
on the selection of senior executives, see Bandiera et al. ð2010Þ, Kaplan, Klebanov,
and Sorensen ð2012Þ, and Graham, Harvey, and Puri ð2013Þ.
2 See Grenadier ð2002Þ, Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen ð2007Þ, and references
therein.
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getting an offer relative to a higher uncertainty applicant. At the intern-
ship stage, the odds are only 1.66 times better for the low-uncertainty ap-
plicants relative to the rest. We also document that the preference toward
certainty when hiring is particularly high for firms that are less prestigious
or smaller, as well as when firms face fewer competitors recruiting from
the same pool of applicants.
Overall, these results suggest that uncertainty hinders hiring and that
this effect is magnified by the costs that firms face for firing poor matches
or finding replacements and diminished by the degree of competition for
talent that they face. Probationary or temporary employment arrange-
ments similar to the summer internships we consider are widespread and
continue to gain importance. This type of employment has been shown to
be a stepping stone to permanent employment, accounting for a signifi-
cant percentage of jobs across the world: for example, 10% in the United
Kingdom ðBooth, Francesconi, and Frank 2002Þ and 35% in Spain ðGu¨ell
and Petrongolo 2007Þ. Using US survey data, Houseman ð2001Þ reports
that temporary and part-time workers are employed by 46% and 72% of
business establishments, respectively. While providing firms with flexi-
bility to weather changes in the economic environment ðSegal and Sullivan
1997; Levin 2002Þ, temporary and contract employment is also valued for
offering firms the option to learn about the quality of workers. In the
US survey sample constructed by Houseman ð2001Þ, 21% of employers
using temporary workers from agencies and 15% using part-time work-
ers cite screening as an important reason for using these types of work
arrangements.
In this paper,we focus on a specific form of employee uncertainty—the
unknown degree to which an individual will be a good fit for a firm’s
industry. There are other characteristics of workers that may be uncertain,
including general ability traits that cannot be fully determined in the hir-
ing process and the degree to which a potential hire fits the specific firm
that considers hiring him or her. We focus on industry fit uncertainty be-
cause we can measure the degree to which a candidate’s fit with a particular
industry is known by firms and because we observe significant variation in
the data regarding industry fit uncertainty.
In human capital investments, concerns about the inherent heteroge-
neity of human capital add to those brought by uncertainty regarding
product market demand. Our data allow us to focus on firms’ option to
learn as they determine the value of these assets ði.e., the employeesÞ over
time rather than on the option to wait for information revelation in the
product market.3
3 Stein and Stone ð2013Þ show empirically that product demand-side uncer-
tainty depresses aggregate hiring. Kahn and Lange ð2014Þ point out a type of
employee heterogeneity that is more analogous to the option to wait in real option
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As documented by Oyer and Schaefer ð2011Þ, few prior papers have
studied firms’ strategic choice about how much risk to take when hiring,
and most of this work is theoretical. One paper in this area is Lazear
ð1998Þ, which presents a model of the option to learn in a labor market
context and states conditions under which hiring risky workers can be a
profit-maximizing strategy for firms. Given the institutional context we
study empirically, our setting differs from that in Lazear ð1998Þ in a few
key ways. We focus on industry-specific productivity and study an envi-
ronment where firms post and pay the same wage to all employees. While
few empirical papers have studied howmuch and why firms choose to hire
workers with uncertain productivity ðsee Bollinger and Hotchkiss ½2003
and Hendricks, DeBrock, and Koenker ½2003 for examples from sports
marketsÞ, much of the extant labor literature takes it as a given that firms
take substantial risks when hiring workers. For example, our work builds
on the large literatures regarding matching and employer learning. How-
ever, while most prior work focuses on firms learning about an employ-
ee’s ability or the quality of the match to the firm, we focus on work-
ers’ match to an industry. Our work is inspired by the classic Jovanovic
ð1979Þ matching model; the learning models in Waldman ð1984Þ, Green-
wald ð1986Þ, and Farber and Gibbons ð1996Þ; and the idea in Prescott
and Visscher ð1980Þ that organization capital is enhanced by the ability to
learn more about workers’ characteristics before assigning them to spe-
cific production tasks by observing their performance in an apprenticeship-
like endeavor.
Getting a better understanding of the matching process in high-skill en-
vironments such as the one studied here is important given the increasing
prevalence of graduate degrees and the significant role of high-skill and
professional labor markets in the economy. The process of matching firms
and employees early in their career is also particularly interesting to study
in light of the strong impact of these initial matches on long-term employ-
ment and compensation ðOyer 2008Þ. Our empirical results provide some
guidance on what employers are searching for in at least one high-talent
market.4
4 Data on MBA graduates have recently been used in other economics and fi-
nance research. For example, Shue ð2013Þ finds that networking through MBA
education leads executives to exhibit commonalities in firm policies. Bertrand,
Goldin, andKatz ð2010Þ document a rising gap in earnings betweenmen andwomen
models of physical capital by considering the fact that workers’ productivity is
constantly changing and that these changes differ across people. This suggests that
firms might value both the option to learn and the option to wait on employees as
they do with other assets ðsee Grenadier and Malenko 2010Þ, so that they can see
how a given worker’s productivity develops. However, because our empirical anal-
ysis focuses ðdue to data availabilityÞ on the initial firm/worker match, we cannot
analyze this form of option value.
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Our paper complements the emerging finance literature regarding the
role of workers on corporate decisions and outcomes. For example, the
firms’ workforce characteristics have been shown to influence capital struc-
ture choices, theoretically and empirically ðe.g., Berk, Stanton, and Zechner
2010; Agrawal and Matsa 2013; Schmalz 2015Þ, as well as the cost of capi-
tal ðEisfeldt and Papanikolaou 2013Þ. The acquisition of productive labor,
not just physical assets, is an important driver of merger and acquisitions
ðM&AÞ decisions ðOuimet and Zarutskie 2011Þ.
We discuss the underlying conceptual framework that motivates our
empirical analysis in Section II of the paper. We describe the data set and
the key features of our empirical setting in Sections III and IV. Section V
contains the empirical results, and Section VI concludes.
II. Conceptual Framework
We now motivate the empirical work to follow by laying out an intu-
itive conceptual framework tomatch the settingwe analyze.Our data come
from a 2-year full-time MBA program. The vast majority of students have
a work history from before their time in the MBA program, do an intern-
ship in the summer between the 2 years of the program, and take a full-time
job upon graduation. Internships give summer employers an opportunity
to learn about the students before making a commitment for full-time
employment.
Following Lazear ð1998Þ, we consider a market where potential hires
vary in both predictable and unpredictable ways. Specifically, a potential
hire’s productivity at a firm is increasing in each of three attributes. First,
the person will be more productive if his or her general ability, which we
will measure through grades, is higher. Second, the person will be more
productive if his or her skills and interests are a good match for the in-
dustry in which the firm operates. Finally, there is an idiosyncratic firm-
worker match component driven, for example, by how well the person fits
with the other workers of the firm or with the firm’s strategies. Employers
can learn important things along all these dimensions during an internship.
However, given that firms already have a significant amount of information
about the person’s academic success, which is our proxy for general ability,
internships are especially likely to be informative about industry and idio-
syncratic match quality. Learning along both these dimensions during the
summer internship is certainly valuable to firms.However,we only have the
ability to empirically study learning about industry fit, and hence we focus
after graduation from business school. Kaniel, Massey, and Robinson ð2010Þ find
that optimistic MBA students receive job offers faster than their peers. Ahern,
Duchin, and Shumway ð2015Þfind positive peer effects in risk aversion amongMBA
students, while Malmendier and Lerner ð2013Þ document MBA peer effects in en-
trepreneurial pursuits.
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our analysis on this dimension.5 Specifically, our data allow us to quantify
the uncertainty regarding the fit between a potential employee and a firm’s
industry. We observe the pre-MBA jobs of the students in our sample, and
hence we canmeasure the degree of experience that a job candidate has with
the industry of the firm to which he or she is applying.
A simple way to capture this setting is to have the productivity of can-
didate i working for firm j in industry k be: Productivityijk 5 General
Abilityi1Firm-Specific Fitij1 Industry Fitik, where Industry Fitik5 1with
probability p or 0 with probability ð1 2 pÞ. In other words, the industry
fit of a candidate could be high or low. Upon receiving a job application
from a candidate, the firm knows the probability p that the industry fit
will be high but not the actual value of Industry Fitik.
The expected value of industry fit will be increasing in p, and we will
also say that the “uncertainty” regarding a potential employee’s fit with
the industry is decreasing with p. That is, the firm is more “certain” of a
good fit as p increases. Conditional on the applicant wanting a job and
surviving several rounds of interviews, firms will have a pretty good ðbut
far from perfectÞ sense for industry fit.6
Now compare two groups of job candidates: for one group, it is unclear
whether industry fit will be high or low. In other words, the firm has the
least amount of information about this person’s fit. This corresponds to
p well below 1. A natural case in which this may happen is when the job
candidate is somebody who never worked in the industry of the firm be-
fore. These potential employees and their potential employers are sym-
metrically uninformed regarding their industry fit and, for any given ap-
plicant, the probability of fit being high will be identical and equal to the
mean in the population ðp < 1Þ.
Members of the other group have worked in the industry before, and
they know ðor have a good ideaÞ whether they are a good fit for the in-
dustry. In our data, this might mean a candidate who worked in the exact
narrow industry of the firm before. Given that these are all graduates of
5 There is no variation in our sample in terms of the uncertainty in the firm-
specific fit of each applicant-firm pair, since for each such pair there is no prior
employment relationship ði.e., there is a high level of uncertainty about the firm-
specific fit for each of these pairsÞ. The variation that we can observe, and relate to
hiring outcomes, comes from uncertainty in the industry fit of these candidates, as
given by their industry experience. Hence, the paper focuses on the importance of
learning about industry fit and documents that this aspect of the candidate’s pro-
ductivity is important for firms’ hiring decisions. However, firm-specific fit could
also be very important, and we leave it to future work, based on data where there is
measurable variation in firm-specific fit, to cleanly identify this effect.
6 An alternative framework, which would be somewhat more complicated, but
which would lead to similar predictions, is to let Industry Fitik follow a distri-
bution where its mean is increasing and its variance is decreasing in relevant pre-
MBA experience.
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a top business school, we expect that those who know ðor are fairly sureÞ
that they have low fit with an industry will not apply for a job in that
industry because they can expect to do better elsewhere. This leads to
positive selection among those applicants who have prior industry expe-
rience. The firm to which such a person applies can assign a very high
probability that the industry fit will be high ðp ∼ 1Þ.
Empirically, the industry experience of a candidate will be our proxy
for the probability p that the person has a high value for Industry Fitik. We
label the uncertainty about the candidates’ industry fit as either low, me-
dium, or high. Uncertainty is low in the case of people who have worked
in the specific narrowly defined industry of the firm. For these people,
the probability p that Industry Fitik is high is close to 1. For example, this
would be the case of a student previously employed by an investment
bank who applies for a job with another investment bank recruiting on
campus. Uncertainty is high in the case of candidates who have not worked
in organizations that, broadly speaking, belong to the same industry as that
of the firm they are applying to. For these applicants, p is relatively low.
This would be the case of somebody whose entire work experience is in
consulting but who is now applying to a job in investment banking. Fi-
nally, uncertainty is medium when the candidate has previously worked in
the same broadly defined industry. For example, this would happen when
a candidate previously employed by a commercial bank now applies to an
investment banking position. In other words, we can classify each appli-
cant to a particular job as being characterized by either low, medium, or
high uncertainty regarding their fit with the industry of the firm posting
that job. The main empirical prediction we test is whether the odds that an
application results in a job offer are higher for candidates characterized by
low uncertainty about industry fit relative to candidates characterized by
either medium or high uncertainty about industry fit.
Our predictions regarding the effect of general ability on a student’s job
market prospects are straight forward: we expect students with better
grades to be more attractive in the job market. This should be true at both
the summer internship and permanent hiring stages. Hence, we expect
better academic performance to have a positive effect on the probability of
an interested student getting a job offer from a given firm.7
As we proceed empirically, we assume that it is detrimental for a firm to
hire a person who is a poor industry fit because the employee will be un-
productive and firing and replacing the person will be costly. Moreover,
the cost of hiring a bad fit is likely lower for summer interns than for
permanent hires because the firm can simply choose not to continue the
7 Some top schools have grade nondisclosure norms that likely mute the effect
of grades on job prospects. However, that is not a concern at this school, as
students typically disclose their GPAs and firms seek this information.
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employment relationship at the end of the summer. Perhaps most con-
troversially, we assume that firms offer the same wage to all people to
whom they offer jobs. This is a strong assumption in that it precludes the
labor market clearing through wage competition. As we show below, we
can justify this in our context, as employers generally offer the same wage
to all new MBA hires and post these wages prior to observing the candi-
date pool.
Under these assumptions, consider a firm deciding to whom it should
make offers. At either the summer internship or the full-time hiring stage,
the firmwill always prefer higher general ability candidates and will prefer
industry stayers ði.e., low-uncertainty applicantsÞ to industry switchers
ði.e., higher uncertainty onesÞ. We expect firms to be less concerned about
the uncertainty in the candidate’s industry fit in situations when firing or
replacing a revealed poor match is easier and when firms face the risk that
waiting before making offers may lead them to face a worse pool of avail-
able candidates. Hence, we expect to find that firms will take more risks in
summer hiring. That is, the lack of industry experience will be less of a
factor for summer hiring than for full-time hiring. Moreover, like Lazear
ð1998Þ, we expect to find firms to be less risk tolerant when they face higher
firing or replacement costs. In our setting, higher costs of this type will
induce firms to value industry experience relatively highly. Since firms do
not own employees’ human capital, we expect that the negative effect of
uncertainty on hiring is not reduced for candidates with high levels of
general ability, or redeployability. Finally, we expect that when firms face
many competitors, they should be more inclined to hire riskier workers
rather than wait for the resolution of uncertainty but likely face a pool of
candidates of lower quality during later stages of recruiting. Our empirical
analysis tests these predictions about the role of uncertainty regarding job
applicants’ industry fit on the decisions of firms to hire.
III. Data
We use a novel data set describing detailed aspects of the recruiting pro-
cess conducted by a large number of globally known firms at a top business
school in the United States. The data span three MBA cohorts during the
period 2007–9, encompassing 1,482 job applicants and 383 firms, covering
both internship and full-time recruiting. The data include details regarding
the firms’ identity and industry, job openings posted, and the candidates’
personal andwork background,MBA coursework completed, applications
sent during both recruiting stages, and offers received. Importantly, we
also know the grade point averages ðGPAÞ of these individuals while in
business school, which provide us with a proxy for their general ability.8
Table 1 provides basic summary statistics for these job candidates andfirms.
8 See Kuhnen ð2011Þ for more details regarding the data set.
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We describe firms using various measures of industry, size, and pres-
tige. We use a broad breakdown of industry, putting firms into one of six
categories—consulting, finance, general corporations, technology, govern-
ment/nonprofit, and other services ðmainly law firmsÞ, as well as a narrow
classification scheme, based on the 60-industry breakdown used by the
business school providing the data. We measure firm size based on annual
revenues or the number of employees. These figures are collected from
Compustat in the case of publicly traded firms and from databases com-
piled by Hoovers, Manta.com, and Vault.com in the case of private firms.
We classify a firm as prestigious if it is listed in the Fortune MBA 100 an-
nual rankings during 2007–9.9 Fortune constructs this list by asking MBA
9 The rankings for 2007–9 are available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines
/fortune/mba100/2007.
Table 1
Summary Statistics for Job Candidates and Firms
Variable Statistic
A. Job candidates ðN 5 1,482Þ:
Male ð%Þ 65.80
International student ð%Þ 39.13
Attended top 100 college ð%Þ 48.33
GPA:
Mean 3.45
SD .28
Median 3.46
Age ðyearsÞ:
Mean 30.11
SD 2.19
Median 30.00
B. Firms ðN 5 383Þ:
Industry ð%Þ:
General corporations 33.94
Finance 29.50
Technology 17.23
Consulting 15.93
Other services 2.09
Government/nonprofit 1.31
On Fortune MBA 100 list ð%Þ 24.28
Publicly traded ð%Þ 58.49
Annual sales ð$ billionsÞ:
Mean 22.56
SD 43.52
Median 6.03
Employees ðthousandsÞ:
Mean 54.63
SD 135.20
Median 15.40
Posted jobs located in the United States ð%Þ 98.10
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students at various business schools where they would most like to work.
Companies that are included on this list are labeled as “Top 100 MBA
Employers.”
The recruiting process at the business school providing the data for this
study is well structured. It unfolds in a series of steps. ðiÞ The recruiting
process begins during the first year of the 2-year MBA program when
students submit resumes ðat no costÞ to companies that will offer on-
campus recruiting for summer internships, indicating they would like the
company to interview them. ðiiÞ Employers select some of these students,
known as the “closed” interviewing list. ðiiiÞ Then an “open” or “bidding”
phase takes place. Students bid points from their annual endowment of
800 to obtain an interview slot. Given the scarcity of bid points, getting an
open interview is costly. ðivÞ The firm interviews those chosen on the
closed list and those who bid enough points to get on the open list, and af-
ter these interviews, the firm makes offers to some students. ðvÞ Each stu-
dent then accepts or rejects the offer. ðviÞ At some point after the summer
internship, the firm may make the student an offer to return to a full-time
position upon graduation.
Steps i–v repeat for the second-year students applying for full-time post-
MBA positions. Those who participate in the full-time recruiting stage
include most students who did not get an offer to return to their summer
employer ðat least not as of the start of the on-campus recruiting seasonÞ
and those who got an offer but want to continue to explore alternatives.
The data we have on this process include which students applied to
which openings through both the open and closed systems, how many
points each student bid when applying for an open interview, whether or
not the person got an offer from each job to which they applied, which
offer the student accepted, and whether each summer internship led to a
full-time offer. Unfortunately, we do not see data on intermediate steps,
such as whether a student was selected for a closed interview or howmany
rounds of interviews a student completed.
On-campus recruiting for summer internships occurs from January to
March of the first year in the program. On-campus recruiting for full-time
positions begins near the start of the second year of the MBA program,
in October. For the students in the cohorts studied here, we observe 2,286
internship offers, 68% of which are obtained through the on-campus in-
ternship recruiting system during the students’ first year in the MBA pro-
gram, 1% are summer positions with their pre-MBA employer, and 31%
are obtained through other, off-campus channels. Also, we observe 1,676
full-time joboffers.Among these, 34%are the result of a successful summer
internship, 35% are obtained through the on-campus full-time recruiting
stage in the students’ second year of theMBA program, 9% are offers from
their pre-MBA employer, and 22% come through other off-campus chan-
nels. Our analysis is focused on the on-campus hiring activity, because for
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firms that post either internship or full-time positions using the on-campus
recruiting system, we know the complete set of applications received for
each position, as well as which applications resulted in offers. The resulting
sample consists of 30,783 applications, of which 21,683 are for internships
and come from 1,249 unique students and 9,100 are for full-time positions
and come from 968 unique students. One hundred percent of the students
in the three cohorts studied here used the on-campus recruiting process,
either for internships or for full-time jobs.
IV. Key Features of the Empirical Setting
A. Wages Are Set Prior to Hiring
The first key feature in the data is that firms offer a single wage for any
given position. This implies that wages offered to candidates do not de-
pend on individual characteristics such as general ability or industry ex-
perience. An institutional detail driving this feature is that employers that
recruit on campus are required to post details such as the job title, loca-
tion, and salary at the very beginning of the recruiting season, before see-
ing any candidates. As shown in the regression model in table 2, the data
confirm that starting salaries for full-time positions, which characterize
the first year of employment after graduate school, are specific to the po-
sition available and do not depend on characteristics of the person who
receives the employment offer.10 Specifically, controlling for class, indus-
try, job location, and company–job title fixed effects, we find no evidence
that the GPA, quality of undergraduate institution attended, industry ex-
perience, age, gender, or international student status of the person receiv-
ing the full-time offer are related to the offered wage ðeither in logs or lev-
elsÞ. Furthermore, in the data, only 10.8% of starting full-time wages are
renegotiated, and the corresponding figure for internships is 1.72%. As a
result, it is unlikely that wages are used in this setting as a means for se-
lecting, screening, or bargaining with candidates with specific character-
istics ðe.g., a high or a low level of uncertainty regarding their productiv-
ityÞ. This feature of the setting eases the interpretation of our empirical
10 We only have data concerning starting salaries. The flexibility to give lower
raises and bonuses to poor performers lowers adjustment costs for firms and
therefore may ease the hiring of risky workers. Signing bonuses are also not in-
cluded in our data set. If firms make significant changes in compensation on this
margin, this would make it less likely for us to observe that industry experience
is positively related to the likelihood of application success because people with
more industry experience would become more expensive relative to those with less
industry experience. We do not think that this is an important issue, because an-
ecdotal evidence suggests that signing bonuses do not vary with industry experi-
ence. Also, the fact that the data show a strong connection between industry ex-
perience and odds of application success indicates that signing bonus variation is not
great enough to make the evidence inconsistent with our theoretical predictions.
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results concerning firms’ hiring decisions and their dependence on the un-
certainty regarding candidates’ industry fit.
B. Hiring Firms Face Uncertainty
The second key data feature for our analysis is that many applicants have
unknown industry fit because they have not worked in the exact industry
of the hiring firm, creating uncertainty regarding their future productivity.
We observe that among all applications sent for jobs, the fraction coming
from individuals who have not worked in the broadly defined industry
of the hiring firm is 68% at the internship stage and 65% at the full-time
stage. The fraction of applications that come from individuals who have
not worked in the narrowly defined ði.e., using the 60-category classifi-
cation scheme created by the schoolÞ industry of the hiring firm is 89%.For
full-time jobs, the corresponding fraction is 86%.
Hence, when considering the majority of potential candidates, firms
face medium or high levels of uncertainty regarding these individuals’
industry-specific fit. Importantly, while candidates lacking either nar-
Table 2
With Company and Job Characteristics Fixed, Do Salaries for
Full-Time Job Offers Depend on the Ability of the Person
Receiving the Offer? Ordinary Least Squares Wage Regression
Dependent Variable
Wagei LnðWageÞi
GPAMBAi –1,011.57 –.01
ð–1.01Þ ð–1.04Þ
Top_100_Undergradi 332.39 .00
ð.73Þ ð.53Þ
Low_uncertaintyi –201.90 –.01
ð–.38Þ ð–.92Þ
International_studenti –293.09 –.00
ð–.54Þ ð–.40Þ
Malei 522.53 .01
ð1.03Þ ð1.02Þ
Agei –30.89 –.00
ð–.24Þ ð–.40Þ
Constant 93,878.65 11.45
ð9.28Þ*** ð98.05Þ***
Class FEs Yes Yes
Industry FEs Yes Yes
Job source FEs Yes Yes
Job location FEs Yes Yes
Company–job title FEs Yes Yes
R2 .48 .40
NOTE.—N5 1,676. Keeping the company and job characteristics fixed, salaries for
full-time job offers do not depend on the ability of the person receiving the offer.
T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
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rowly or broadly defined industry experience are not as successful in se-
curing offers, as the rest of the analysis will show, they are represented in
the pool of people that firms end up making offers to. Specifically, across
internships and full-time jobs, high-uncertainty ði.e., lacking even broadly
defined industry experienceÞ candidates represent 67% of the applications
pool and 58% of the offer pool. Medium-uncertainty ði.e., lacking nar-
rowly defined, but not broadly defined, industry experienceÞ candidates
represent 21% of the applicant pool and 24% of the offer pool. Finally,
low-uncertainty ði.e., possessing narrowly-defined industry experienceÞ
candidates represent 12% of the applicant pool and 18% of the offer pool.
C. Uncertainty Is Reduced by Learning during Internships
We now examine whether firms learn about employees’ industry fit
during summer internships by looking at which employees are offered
permanent jobs at the end of the summer. If industry fit is well known
ði.e., p is relatively highÞ for those with prior industry experience, then we
would expect firms, on average and holding other factors constant, to be
less satisfied with interns with no prior experience. This suggests a posi-
tive relationship between pre-internship industry experience and the prob-
ability of receiving an offer at the end of the summer. In other words,
summer internships provide the firm with information about the industry
fit of potential employees and this information affects full-time offers.
Table 3 shows that realized patterns in full-time offers are consistent
with this idea. For all categories of firms in our sample, large, small, pres-
tigious or nonprestigious, we observe a very large difference in the prob-
ability that a summer internship results in a full-time offer, depending on
whether the intern is somebody with low or high levels of industry expe-
Table 3
Industry Experience and Probability That a Summer Internship
Results in a Full-Time Job Offer
Low-Uncertainty
Interns ðThose at Firms
in the Same Narrow
Industry as Their
Pre-MBA Employers; %Þ
Mid-/High-Uncertainty
Interns ðThose at Firms
Not in the Same Narrow
Industry as Their
Pre-MBA Employers; %Þ
Difference
between
Low-Uncertainty
Interns and the
Rest ð%Þ
All firms 63.22 40.19 23.03***
Prestigious
firms 75.36 48.54 26.82***
Nonprestigious
firms 43.53 29.23 14.30***
Large firms 63.53 46.29 17.24***
Small firms 79.45 52.13 27.30***
NOTE.—Across all firm categories, industry experience has a significant and positive impact on the
probability that a summer internship results in a full-time offer.
*** p < .01.
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rience. Specifically, summer interns who had worked in the narrow in-
dustry of the firm before business school ðthese are people we referred to as
low-uncertainty candidatesÞ have between 14% and 27% higher proba-
bilities of converting the internship into a full-time job, relative to interns
with lower levels of industry experience ðthese are the people withmedium
or high uncertainty about industry fitÞ. These differences—driven by in-
dustry experience—in the likelihood of having an internship resulting in
an offer for long-term employment are economically large and statistically
significant ðp < .01Þ.
While this pattern is strong and fits our expectation of how uncertainty
about industry fit will affect offers, we cannot completely rule out that
industry-specific human capital is playing a role here. If employees with
prior experience are more productive, then, even holding fit constant, we
might expect them to get offers at higher rates.11
V. Results
A. Uncertainty Hinders Hiring
We find that uncertainty hinders hiring. Figure 1 shows that the success
rate of job applications decreases monotonically with the level of uncer-
tainty regarding the industry fit of the candidates. The fraction of applica-
tions for internships and full-time jobs that result in offers is 7.77% among
low-uncertainty candidates, 5.65% among medium-uncertainty candidates,
and 4.39% among high-uncertainty candidates. These sample frequencies
are different from each other at p < .001, indicating that firms’ hiring de-
cisions may differ across applicant types in a systematic way. Specifically,
figure 1 suggests that employers prefer to make offers to applicants char-
acterized by less uncertainty regarding their productivity, namely, those
individuals with more experience in the particular industry of the hiring
firm.
A natural measure of the firms’ preference toward certainty can be
obtained by comparing the odds that applications result in offers across
various types of candidates, where odds are defined in the usual way as
the probability of success ði.e., offerÞ divided by the probability of failure
ði.e., no offerÞ. In our sample, the odds of application success are 8.42%,
5.99%, and 4.59% for applications coming from low-, medium-, and high-
uncertainty candidates, respectively. Comparing these odds of success
across candidate subsamples, we observe that firms’ interest in making of-
fers is 1.83 times stronger among low-uncertainty candidates relative to
high-uncertainty ones and 1.30 times stronger among medium-uncertainty
candidates versushigh-uncertaintyones.Thepreference for low-uncertainty
11 The fact that offer rates are far from one for those with and without industry
experience suggests that other factors, such as learning about firm-specific fit or
budget limitations, also drive who receives post-summer offers.
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applicants is 1.71 times stronger than for the other two categories ði.e.,
medium and high uncertaintyÞ combined. These ratios of odds of success in
getting offers are summarized in figure 2. An odds ratio equal to 1 would
indicate that firms’ hiring decisions do not differ across different types of
job candidates. However, Wald chi-square tests show that all these odds
ratios are significantly different from 1 at p < .001, implying that firms
prefer less uncertainty to more when they decide to whom jobs should be
offered.
While these univariate results suggest that uncertainty hinders hiring
decisions, other interpretations are possible and must be investigated. For
example, people with less experience in the industry of the firm to which
they apply, whom we have so far referred to as higher-uncertainty can-
didates, may have lower general ability or other characteristics that make
them less desirable to employers. It is also possible that there are more
industry-switching ði.e., higher-uncertaintyÞ candidates in particular co-
horts graduating at times when firms do not hire as much, for example,
during recession years.Moreover, industry-switching candidates may tend
to apply to industries with fewer jobs available, or, within an industry, to
firms with a lower capacity to hire, or to those faced with a higher number
of applicants.
We account for these potential confounds in the econometric models
in table 4. There we estimate three models predicting the likelihood that
a job application results in an offer: a linear probability model, a logistic
FIG. 1.—Fraction of applications that result in job offers, by the level of uncer-
tainty in candidates’ productivity as indicated by their industry experience.
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regression showing odds ratios effects, and a generalized linear model
ðGLMÞ indicating risk ratios effects, with the goal of identifying the effect
of the candidates’ uncertainty about industry fit on their likelihood of suc-
cess. As control variables, we include the candidates’ GPA, which is our
proxy for their general ability, as well as indicator variables for gender and
international student status ðthe latter may influence hiring decisions due
to work visa concernsÞ. We also include cohort fixed effects, as well as
industry fixed effects. Moreover, we control for the number of interview
slots available to applicants for each specific job opening, as a way to
account for the firms’ capacity to hire. Finally, to account for the possi-
bility that different organizations may face different numbers of appli-
cants, we control for firm size ðas measured by salesÞ and prestige, as well
as for the number of competing companies in the same industry that are
recruiting concurrently.
As shown by the results in table 4, even after accounting for these con-
founding factors in hiring decisions, we continue to observe a very strong
negative effect of industry fit uncertainty on the likelihood that an appli-
cation will result in the firm making an offer. Using the logistic regression
specification, which is the easiest to interpret, we find that low-uncertainty
andmedium-uncertainty candidates have odds of receiving an offer that are
1.90 times and 1.24 times higher, respectively, as those candidates charac-
terized by high uncertainty about industry fit. These estimates are very
FIG. 2.—Firms’ preference for certainty, as measured by the ratio of the odds of
application success ði.e., resulting in offerÞ for different types of candidates: low-
versus high-uncertainty candidates, medium- versus high-uncertainty candidates,
and low- versus either high- or medium-uncertainty candidates. All odds ratios are
significantly different than 1 at p < .01. An odds ratio equal to 1 would indicate that
firms’ hiring decisions do not differ across different types of job candidates.
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close to the univariate results shown in figure 2, and they illustrate yet again
that firms prefer certainty when they make hiring decisions. These effects
are significant at p < .01 and are common across all three empirical speci-
fications in the table.
The control variables included in the model in table 4 have the expected
effects. Specifically, the odds of application success are higher for candi-
Table 4
The Effect of Uncertainty Regarding Job Applicants’ Industry Fit on the
Firms’ Decision to Make Offers: Three Models
The Dependent Variable Is an Indicator Equal to 1 for Each
Application of a Candidate i to Job j That Resulted in an Offer
Linear
Probability Model
Logistic Regression,
Odds Ratios Effects
Generalized Linear
Model, Risk
Ratios Effects
Low_uncertaintyij .03 1.90 1.81
ð6.95Þ*** ð8.32Þ*** ð8.77Þ***
Medium_uncertaintyij .01 1.24 1.22
ð2.68Þ*** ð3.02Þ*** ð3.26Þ***
GPAi .05 3.19 2.96
ð9.93Þ*** ð10.23Þ*** ð10.99Þ***
International_studenti –.03 .53 .55
ð–10.27Þ*** ð–9.76Þ*** ð–10.09Þ***
Malei –.02 .69 .71
ð5.53Þ*** ð–6.24Þ*** ð–6.70Þ***
Interview_slotsj .0003 1.01 1.01
ð2.26Þ** ð2.51Þ** ð3.25Þ***
LnðFirm_salesjÞ .003 1.09 1.08
ð3.58Þ*** ð3.20Þ*** ð4.14Þ***
Prestigiousj 2.01 .78 .80
ð–2.63Þ*** ð–2.63Þ*** ð–3.20Þ***
Many_competitorsj .01 1.08 1.07
ð1.40Þ*** ð.99Þ ð1.17Þ
Internship stage .01 1.38 1.35
ð4.11Þ*** ð4.09Þ*** ð4.81Þ***
Class FEs Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes
R2 .02 .05 .05
NOTE.—N 5 30,783. The three panels report the results of a linear probability model, a logistic re-
gression, and a GLM model. Candidate i to job j is characterized as having low, medium, or high un-
certainty regarding industry fit if he or she has worked in the same narrowly defined industry as that of the
firm offering job j, if he or she has worked in the same broadly ðbut not narrowlyÞ defined industry as that
of the firm offering job j, and, respectively, if he or she has not worked in the broadly defined industry to
which the firm belongs. For example, candidates applying to a job j in investment banking have high
uncertainty regarding industry fit if they never worked in any finance-related industry before; if they
previously worked in commercial banking, for example, they would have a medium level of uncertainty
regarding industry fit, whereas candidates who worked in investment banking before have a low level of
uncertainty regarding industry fit for job j. The reference ðthus omittedÞ category in all three models is
High_uncertaintyij. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the job level and
are robust to heteroskedasticity.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
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dates with a higher GPA during business school, those who are not inter-
national students, women, and those applying to larger or to less prestigious
firms as well as to job openings with more interview slots. Applications
are also significantly more likely to result in offers at the internship stage
compared to the full-time recruiting stage. Specifically, the odds of an ap-
plication resulting in an offer are 1.38 times higher for internships than for
full-time jobs ðp < .01Þ.
The results in table 4 indicate that, controlling for other firm and ap-
plicant characteristics that may be important for hiring decisions, higher
uncertainty regarding the applicants’ industry fit lessens the chance that
firms will hire them. In other words, uncertainty about productivity hin-
ders corporate investment in people, similar to the effect previously doc-
umented in the case of investment in physical assets. We now turn to an-
alyzing whether differences in the adjustment costs or competition faced
by firms affect uncertainty on hiring in ways that also parallel the effects
documented in the context of physical investments.
B. Adjustment Costs Magnify the Effect of Uncertainty on Hiring
1. Firing Costs
To understand whether uncertainty is more detrimental to hiring when
firms face higher firing costs, we analyze whether the lack of information
about a candidate’s industry fit reduces the odds of success of his or her
application more at the full-time recruiting stage, when the costs of dis-
solving a poor match are high, than at the internship recruiting stage, when
these costs are relatively small.
The logistic regression in table 5 presents evidence consistent with this
hypothesis. The goal of the econometricmodel is to identify the differences
in the odds that an application results in a job offer across different levels
of uncertainty about industry fit and across the two recruiting stages.
The analysis includes the same set of firm and job applicant controls as
used in table 4. The reference category refers to applications coming from
individuals characterized by medium or high uncertainty about industry
fit. Our prior results suggest that this category of applications should have
lower odds of success compared to low-uncertainty candidates, and the
results in the table confirm that this is indeed the case. At the internship
stage, the odds of success of a low-uncertainty applicant are 1.66 times as
high as those of other candidates ðp < .01Þ, while at the full-time recruiting
stage, the odds of success of a low-uncertainty applicant are 2.38 times as
high as those of the other, more uncertain, candidates ðp < .01Þ. These two
effects are significantly different from each other, as well as significantly
different from 1 ði.e., the indifference thresholdÞ, at p < .05. Therefore, the
preference of firms to hire people characterized by low uncertainty about
industry fit is particularly pronounced at the full-time recruiting stage,
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when the costs of firing and replacing a poor match are much higher than
at the internship stage.
Note that the estimation method in table 5 allows us to avert two po-
tential confounding effects. First, perhaps there are more industry switch-
ers ði.e., less experienced and thus higher uncertainty candidatesÞ in the
applicant pool at the internship stage relative to the full-time stage, so
even if firms have equally strong reservations about hiring more uncertain
candidates at the two stages, theywouldmechanically end upmakingmore
offers to such applicants at the internship stage. To account for this, the
logistic models in table 5 compare at each recruiting stage the odds of
application success for the subset of low-uncertainty candidates to the odds
of success in the subset of more uncertain candidates, and this comparison
does not depend on the difference in the prevalence of low-uncertainty
Table 5
The Effect of Uncertainty on Hiring Decisions for Each of the
Two Recruiting Stages: Internship and Full-Time Hiring
The Dependent Variable Is an Indicator Equal
to 1 for Each Application of a Candidate i to
Job j That Resulted in an Offer
Internship Recruiting
Stage
Full-Time Recruiting
Stage
Low_uncertaintyij 1.66 2.38
ð5.83Þ*** ð6.07Þ***
GPAi 3.31 2.88
ð9.11Þ*** ð4.76Þ***
International_studenti .57 .44
ð–7.77Þ*** ð–6.31Þ***
Malei .70 .63
ð–5.13Þ*** ð–3.78Þ***
Interview_slotsj 1.01 .99
ð3.14Þ*** ð–1.65Þ*
LnðFirm_salesjÞ 1.08 1.11
ð2.37Þ** ð2.40Þ**
Prestigiousj .78** .81
ð–2.28Þ ð–1.26Þ
Many_competitorsj 1.17 .92
ð1.87Þ** ð–.43Þ
Class FEs Yes Yes
Industry FEs Yes Yes
R2 .04 .07
Observations 21,683 9,100
NOTE.—The internship recruiting stage applications in our data set are the appli-
cations sent to firms that come to campus to recruit when students are in their first year
of the MBA program. The full-time recruiting stage applications are the applications
sent to firms that come to campus to recruit when students are in their second year of
the MBA program. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered
at the job level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
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applicants between the two recruiting stages. Second, perhaps the pool of
industry switchers ði.e., higher uncertainty candidatesÞ at the internship
stage is better somehow—for example, they may have higher general
ability—than the pool of switchers still looking for a job at the full-time
stage. This should lead to firms being more likely to make offers to higher
uncertainty people at the internship stage compared to the full-time stage.
However, this cannot drive the wedge in the firms’ preference for low-
uncertainty people between these two recruiting stages that we document
in table 5, since there we control for candidate characteristics, including
their general ability as measured by their GPA.
Another potential confound in the interpretation of the difference in the
effect of the low-uncertainty indicator on the odds of application success
at the internship and the full-time stage ð1.66 vs. 2.38Þ is that perhaps
people whom we label as low-uncertainty candidates at the full-time re-
cruiting stage may in fact be characterized by lower uncertainty about
their industry fit, relative to people whom we label as low-uncertainty
candidates at the internship recruiting stage. This can happen if people
who apply to jobs in a particular industry at the full-time stage tend to
have already done internships in that same industry. In such a scenario,
firms recruiting for full-time positions would assess that the probability
of these industry-experienced candidates of having high industry fit is
greater than the probability they would assign for a similar applicant at the
internship stage.
To check whether or not this alternative mechanism explains our find-
ing that the odds of success for low-uncertainty people versus the others
are significantly better at the full-time stage relative to the internship stage
ði.e., 2.38 vs. 1.66Þ, in unreported analyses we estimated the same logistic
model for the probability that an application results in an offer at the full-
time stage, as in the last column of table 5. We did this, however, only for
full-time job applications coming from individuals who at the internship
stage took a summer job in a broad industry different from that they were
in before coming to business school. If the alternative account is correct,
then the coefficient on the low uncertainty variable in this logistic regres-
sion should be equal to that obtained in the logistic regression estimated at
the internship stage, which is in column 1 of table 5 ði.e., 1.66Þ. This is
because the degree of uncertainty is the same for the people in these two
analyses, since for both samples of applicants the only information about
their industry fit is conferred by the identity of their pre-MBA industry.
However, what we find is that the coefficient in this logistic regression is
2.45, which is close to, and statistically not distinguishable from, the 2.38
coefficient in the logistic model estimated for the full-time stage, for all
those applying for jobs at that stage, irrespective of their internship indus-
try. This implies that the difference in the impact of the low uncertainty
variable on the odds of application success that we see between the intern-
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ship and the full-time stage is not related to a change in the degree of un-
certainty of what we label as low uncertainty candidates.
Overall, these results suggest that there exists a strengthening in firms’
preference to hire workers with less uncertain industry fit from the pro-
bationary to the full-time recruiting stage. This is consistent with the idea
that at the full-time stage it is more costly to fire an employeewho has been
revealed to be a poor match.
2. Replacement Costs
We now turn to examining whether firms that face lower costs of hiring
a replacement for a revealed poor match will be less concerned about can-
didates’ uncertainty regarding industry fit and hence more likely to hire
riskier workers. Two categories of firms are likely to face relatively low
replacement costs for poor matches: prestigious and large organizations.
First, firms that are widely regarded as prestigious places to work are likely
to receive numerous applications through many recruiting channels, and
hence they can find suitable candidates with ease. Second, large firms have
dedicated human resources departments and can tap into numerous re-
cruiting venues ðincluding internal staff; see Tate and Yang 2015Þ to find
new candidates for a particular position. Hence, we expect that the firms
that will be the least concerned about candidate uncertainty will be the
prestigious and large ones.
In the logistic regressions in table 6, we estimate the effect of uncer-
tainty on hiring decisions as a function of firm prestige. A firm is labeled as
prestigious if it was included in the Fortune MBA 100 annual rankings
during 2007–2009. The analysis includes the same set of firm and job ap-
plicant controls as used in table 4. We find that the preference of firms for
low-uncertainty candidates is stronger for nonprestigious firms compared
to prestigious ones, as predicted. Specifically, low-uncertainty candidates
have odds of getting an offer that are 2.58 times higher than those of riskier
candidates when applying for positions at nonprestigious firms, but only
1.57 times higher when applying for positions at prestigious firms. These
odds ratio estimates are significantly different at p < .01.
A natural concern is that these differences in the odds ratios across the
two different types of firms do not indicate differences across firms in
their dislike for uncertainty but rather differences in the composition of
the pool of applicants faced by prestigious and nonprestigious firms. Our
choice to use odds ratios to measure firms’ hiring propensities allows us to
alleviate this concern. Note that in a world where the uncertainty in the
candidates’ fit did not matter for firms’ hiring decisions, the ratio of odds
of success ðwhere odds are defined, as usual, as the probability of success,
i.e., that an application will result in an offer, divided by the probability of
failure, i.e., that the application will not result in an offerÞ of the low-
uncertainty candidates versus the rest would be equal to 1. This is not
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what the data show.We consistently find this odds ratio to be significantly
higher than 1, meaning that the odds of success in getting job offers are
better for low-uncertainty applicants. Since the odds ratios we estimate
in table 6 are 1.57 for prestigious firms and 2.58 for nonprestigious ones,
the difference between these numbers indicates that, for reasons inde-
pendent of the composition of the applicant pools faced by these two types
of firms, low-uncertainty candidates are particularly successful in getting
offers at nonprestigious firms. Or equivalently, prestigious firms are those
where higher uncertainty applicants have better odds of success.12
The discrepancy in the preference for certainty between these two types
of firms is particularly large at the full-time recruiting stage. At that stage,
low-uncertainty candidates have 3.57 times higher odds of getting offers,
relative to the other candidates, when applying to nonprestigious firms,
whereas for prestigious ones, the corresponding increase in odds is only
1.74 times. These effects are significantly different at p < .01. This suggests
that when firms face both high firing costs, as well as high replacement
costs, they are particularly reluctant to make offers to candidates char-
acterized by higher uncertainty about industry fit.
Turning to our other source of variation in replacement costs, in the
logistic regression in table 7, we estimate the effect of uncertainty on
hiring decisions as a function of firm size, measured by sales. Conducting
the same analysis using the number of employees as our measure of firm
size yields very similar results in terms of both magnitude and significance
levels, so we omit them here for brevity. The analysis includes the same set
of firm and job applicant controls as used in table 4. The results support
the idea that small firms ði.e., with below-median salesÞ are more inclined
to hire low-uncertainty applicants than large firms ði.e., with above-
median salesÞ, in general as well as at each of the two recruiting stages.13
For example, across both internship and full-time recruiting, the odds of
success of low-uncertainty candidates are 2.19 times higher than those of
12 It is also possible that the most prestigious firms attract the best overall can-
didates, for whom prior knowledge about the firm’s industry may be less impor-
tant. That is, industry switchers hired by prestigious firms may have better ability.
In our analysis, we try our best to control for general ability—we use the students’
GPA while in business school as our proxy for general ability, as well as the stu-
dents’ GMAT scores, in alternate specifications ðunreported here for brevityÞ.
That being said, there may be complementarities between industry expertise and
general ability, or nonlinear effects, that differ between prestigious and nonpres-
tigious firms, which our empirical specification may not capture.
13 While we argue that large firms likely face lower costs of finding a replace-
ment for a revealed bad match, they may also face lower costs of dissolving that
bad match by reassigning the person to a different division. Both these channels are
very much in line with our thinking, that is, with the idea that firing and replace-
ment costs modulate the effects of uncertainty regarding industry fit on firms’ hiring
decisions.
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riskier candidates in the case of small firms, but only 1.69 times higher in
the case of large firms. This difference, however, is not statistically sig-
nificant at conventional levels.
The estimates in table 7 show an interesting interaction of the effects of
replacement costs as indicated by firm size with those of firing costs as
indicated by the recruiting stage. The biggest difference in firms’ prefer-
ence for certainty can be seen when comparing the relative odds of success
of low-uncertainty candidates across two scenarios: when applying for
full-time jobs at small firms and when applying for internships at large
firms ðodds ratio estimates of 2.71 vs. 1.55, significantly different at p <
.05Þ. In the first scenario, the recruiting firms face a high firing cost, as well
as a high replacement cost. In the second scenario, recruiting firms can
easily fire a revealed bad match and also face lower costs of finding a
suitable replacement for a revealed poor match. Hence, high firing and
high replacement costs appear to induce firms to prefer certainty more in
the first scenario relative to the second.
3. General Ability
As a final dimension of adjustment costs, we now examine the general
ability of a candidate. Thinking in terms of option value, we would ex-
pect people who are of higher ability to be easier to redeploy if their initial
employment arrangement does not work out for some reason. Also, it is
possible that high-ability candidates can compensate through on-the-job
learning for lack of industry fit. This is potentially analogous to the option
value of physical assets that can be more easily redeployed. Firms are not
reluctant to invest in physical capital with uncertain productivity if those
assets can be easily sold or put to another use. This would suggest that in
the case of candidates with high general ability, the relationship between
their industry expertise and their odds of receiving job offers may be weak
or nonexistent.
Note, however, that there is an important difference from a company’s
perspective between human capital and physical assets. Firms capture the
rents of valuable physical assets whether those rents occur with the in-
tended use of those assets or, if the firm finds the assets not valuable,
through resale or redeployment. But, while the rents from human capital
are shared between the firm and the worker if the match lasts, the worker
captures all the rents if he or she leaves the firm. This suggests that, while
firms are not as concerned about uncertainty regarding physical assets’
future productivity if they are characterized by higher redeployability
ðBloom et al. 2007Þ, higher general ability will not influence the negative
effect of uncertainty about industry fit on the firms’ willingness to make
job offers. In other words, the negative effect of industry-fit uncertainty
on the odds of application success will be equally strong for either low-
general-ability or high-general-ability job applicants.
Exploration for Human Capital: MBA Labor Market S279
This content downloaded from 152.019.225.081 on April 01, 2016 08:53:34 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
The data, as shown in table 8, suggest that this second mechanism may
be more important than the first, as we find that the strength of the pref-
erence that firms have toward low-uncertainty workers is similar across
candidates with high- or low-general ability. We measure general ability
using the person’s grades while in the MBA program. We characterize
each student as having either a high or a low GPA, depending on whether
their GPA is above or below the median. The results in table 8 show that
the odds of an application resulting in an offer for low-uncertainty can-
didates are 1.81 times as high as for the other applicants in the subset of
low-GPA students and 1.83 times as high in the subset of high-GPA stu-
dents. Hence, as predicted, in general, the strength of the preference that
firms have toward low-uncertainty workers is similar across candidates
with high or low general ability. The estimates in table 8 do suggest that at
the full-time recruiting stage, firms’ preference for low uncertainty may be
stronger among the low-GPA candidates relative to the high-GPA ones,
but the two odds ratios estimates ð3.27 vs. 1.96Þ for these subsamples are
only weakly statistically different ðp < .09Þ.
Overall, these results suggest that adjustment costs—in particular, firing
and replacement costs, and to a much lesser extent, the value of the person
in alternative jobs—strengthen the preference of hiring firms toward less
risky candidates. These effects parallel those concerning the interaction
between uncertainty and adjustment costs in the context of physical in-
vestments when the firm can capture the option value. However, in the
case of general ability, where employees capture the value of the ðhumanÞ
capital if it is put to an alternate use, the parallel to physical capital is not
as strong.
C. Competition Diminishes the Effect of Uncertainty on Hiring
The investments literature has shown that firms faced with more com-
petition are less concerned by project uncertainty because waiting for its
resolution may lead to more limited opportunities later on. In our setting,
this argument implies that we should observe a lower impact of candidate
uncertainty on firms’ decisions to make offers for those firms that have
more competitors recruiting at the same time from the same pool of stu-
dents. We find evidence consistent with this hypothesis, as illustrated by
the results in table 9. There we estimate the effect of uncertainty on the
odds that applications result in offers separately for firms that face below
or above median competition, as measured by the number of firms in the
same industry that are concurrently recruiting in the same pool of MBA
students. For the typical, narrowly defined industry in the sample, the
median number of firms recruiting on campus at any given stage ðintern-
ship or full-timeÞ is 10. Hence, for example, if there are 10 or more firms
from the investment banking industry recruiting on campus for full-time
positions in 2007, we label each of these organizations at this particular
S280 Kuhnen/Oyer
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point in time as facing high competition—or, for the sake of clarity, facing
many competing firms.14
The results in table 9 show that the preference for certainty is partic-
ularly strong among recruiters that face few competitors. For these firms,
low-uncertainty applicants have 2.49 times higher odds of getting offers
compared to the riskier applicants. For firms faced with many competi-
tors, the odds of success for low-uncertainty applicants are only 1.63 times
higher than for the rest. These odds ratios are significantly different ðp <
.05Þ. The estimates in table 9 also show an interesting interaction of the
effects of competition with those of firing costs. Specifically, the biggest
difference in firms’ preference for certainty can be seen when comparing
the relative odds of success of low-uncertainty candidates across two sce-
narios: when applying for full-time jobs to firms that face few competitors
and when applying for internships at firms that face many competitors
ðodds ratio estimates of 2.90 vs. 1.60, significantly different at p < .05Þ. In
the first scenarios, the recruiting firms face a high firing cost, and also they
can afford to be selective since applicants do not have much choice. In the
second scenario, recruiting firms can easily fire a revealed bad match and
also do not have the luxury of delaying hiring, since applicants have many
choices of employers in that same industry that are present on campus at
the same time. Hence, both competition effects and firing costs effects lead
firms to prefer certainty more in the first scenario relative to the second.
These results indicate that the concerns that firms have regarding employee
uncertainty indeed diminish with the intensity of competition for talent, in
a similar way as found in the context of physical investments.15
VI. Conclusion
We conduct an empirical study of the role of uncertainty in corporate
hiring decisions. We find that firms are less inclined to make job offers
to candidates characterized by higher uncertainty regarding their industry
fit. The preference of firms for certainty when hiring is magnified when
they are more likely to face higher firing and replacement costs and when
14 Indicating that firms with more industry peers recruiting at the same time
indeed face more competition for talent, we find that with each additional com-
petitor, the number of applications a firm receives per interview slot decreases by
0.02 ðp < .05Þ. The median number of applications per interview slot in our sample
is 1.42.
15 A necessary condition for competition to speed up hiring and lessen the
delaying effect of uncertainty is that firms that wait longer before making offers
will be faced with a lower-quality pool of potential workers. We observe this effect
in our sample, as better candidates leave the available pool sooner. For example,
when examining how the applicant pool changes from the internship stage to the
full-time stage, we observe a decrease in average GPA of a quarter standard de-
viation and a 5% decrease in the prevalence of low-uncertainty candidates.
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they face less competition for talent. Our analysis is based on a unique
data set covering MBA recruiting activity at a top US business school.
We should note that the data have limitations that lead to caveats about
the internal and external validity of our results. First, even though the
career office at the school that provided the data works hard to encourage
students to report all of their offers, it is possible that students do so with
some error. Second, a substantial amount of the job search by students at
this school is done through channels other than on-campus recruiting. In
these cases, we do not have any information about firms’ preferences be-
cause we do not observe who applies to these firms. While we do not think
that these issues bias our results substantially ðif anything, themeasurement
error would imply any relationships in the data are likely to be stronger
than our analysis suggestsÞ, we do not know for sure. Third, the external
validity of our analysis is limited by the fact that our data set covers job
seekers at one school and the particular firms that choose to conduct re-
cruiting activities there.
While these limitations are important, high-skill labor markets such as
the one we study are growing in importance worldwide. Also, there has
been limited empirical work analyzing thematching process between firms
and workers. Therefore, we believe our analysis makes a useful contri-
bution by showing that considerations similar to those used in the context
of physical investments are also significant determinants of corporate hir-
ing decisions.
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